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This essay contributes to and reframes the preliminary scholarly assessments 
of President Donald J. Trump’s appeals to rage, malice, and revenge by sketch-
ing the rhetorical dimensions of an underlying emotional-moral framework 
in which victimization, resentment, and revenge are inverted civic virtues. I 
elaborate on the concept of ressentiment (re-sentiment), a condition in which 
a subject is addled by rage and envy yet remains impotent, subjugated and 
unable to act on or adequately express frustration. Though anger and resent-
ment capture part of Trump’s affective register, I suggest that ressentiment ac-
counts for the unique intersection where powerful sentiments and self-serv-
ing morality are coupled with feelings of powerlessness and ruminations on 
past injuries. Thus, shifting focus from the rhetoric of resentment to that of 
ressentiment explains how Trump is able to sustain the affective charge of an-
imus without forfeiting the moral high ground of victimhood to his audience’s 
“oppressors”— Democrats, the press, criminals, immigrants, foreign adversar-
ies, welfare recipients, the Me Too movement, “globalists,” and racial Others. 
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At a June 27 2017 rally in Youngstown, OH, President Donald J. 
Trump delivered a message to his supporters about, among other 
things, the state of US Immigrant and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
efforts to combat criminal gangs who have illegally entered the coun-
try. In this address, Trump assured his audience that the state has, in 
their name, taken revenge on the nation’s enemies. He boasted: 
We have tough people. Our people are tougher than their people. 
Our people are tougher and stronger and meaner and smarter 
than the gangs. One by one we are finding the illegal gang mem-
bers, drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals and killers. And we 
are sending them the hell back home where they came from. And 
once they are gone, we will never let them back in. Believe me. The 
predators and criminal aliens who poison our communities with 
drugs and prey on innocent young people, these beautiful, beauti-
ful, innocent young people will, will find no safe haven anywhere 
in our country. And you’ve seen the stories about some of these 
animals. They don’t want to use guns, because it’s too fast and it’s 
not painful enough. So they’ll take a young, beautiful girl, 16, 15, 
and others and they slice them and dice them with a knife because 
they want them to go through excruciating pain before they die. 
And these are the animals that we’ve been protecting for so long.1 
In this passage we can observe familiar oscillations between tough-
ness and vulnerability that are characteristic of Trump’s political style. 
On the one hand, the nation is great on account of its spectacular ca-
pacity to revisit and inflict pain on others. Indeed, Trump’s newly 
hardened America is “mean” and “tough.” The nation is no longer 
complacent to be victimized by uncivilized “animals” and “predators.” 
Trump takes credit for liberating besieged communities across the na-
tion and making America safe from drugs and criminal violence. 
On the other hand, the nation is also personified as a vulnerable 
adolescent girl who has been subjected to senseless torture by a cruel 
and implicitly racialized foreign enemy. In contrast to the nation’s cold 
demeanor and newly developed musculature stands a competing na-
tional icon of innocence, passivity, and vulnerable femininity who, 
when contrasted against the brutality of foreign Others, reinforces a 
paradoxical sentiment that the citizenry is at once powerful and agent-
less. Although this message seems incoherent, what unifies tropes of 
toughness and vulnerability is an underlying presumption of a moral 
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order that is validated by the perpetual existence of a hostile external 
world. As such, Trump offers his audience an emotional-moral frame-
work in which feelings and affects such as anger, rage, malice, and 
revenge are never at rest and no one act of vengeance can dissipate 
the nation’s desire for more. The message sustains an affective charge 
by addressing intractable enemies with vague and ill-conceived ob-
jectives. The audience is caught in the perpetual liminality between 
defeat and triumph. By positioning his audience as powerless yet in-
vulnerable, Trump can continue to go back to a renewable reserve of 
anger and bitterness to warrant cruelty against an ever-growing list 
of national enemies. 
This essay contributes to and reframes the preliminary schol-
arly assessments of Trump’s appeals to rage, malice, and revenge by 
sketching the rhetorical dimensions of an underlying emotional-moral 
framework in which victimization, resentment, and revenge are civic 
virtues. Rhetorical scholars who have examined Trump’s speeches, 
rallies, and tweets have found a number of recurring patterns that 
unhinge his supporters from taken-for-granted political conventions 
and unburdens them from civic virtue. For instance, Brian L. Ott and 
Greg Dickinson argue that Trump’s rhetoric can best be understood 
as an extension of fears about the decentering of white masculinity, 
the vitriolic norms of social networking, and the decline of profes-
sional journalism.2 Political appeals to white rage are not new, but 
they suggest that Trump’s style, or manner of delivery, is particularly 
well-suited to a warped media culture that encourages simplicity, im-
pulsivity, cruelty, and narcissism. Although Trump routinely lies and 
contradicts himself, Paul Johnson has argued that Trump’s incoher-
ent vacillations between strength and victimhood enable his white au-
diences to disavow hegemonic whiteness and align themselves with 
a marginalized, politically-exiled subjectivity.3 Trump, he argues, re-
frames his audiences’ generalized sense of human vulnerability as if 
it were the experience of structural racial oppression. Marginaliza-
tion in the form of reverse discrimination and unfair treatment frees 
his supporters of any kind of debt or civic obligation to a seemingly 
cruel and hostile polity. 
Likewise, Robert E. Terrill has argued that Trump unburdens his 
supporters of all social obligations that might otherwise constrain 
the pursuit of their self-interest.4 Chief among these obligations are 
empathy, equality, and other democratic virtues which demand that 
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citizens acknowledge the burdensome legacy of racism that contin-
ues to preclude a truly democratic public culture. Joshua Gunn adds 
that Trump’s political style is perverse, meaning that he is aware of 
these social conventions but he violates them anyway.5 His constant 
disavowals, his reliance on paralepsis and occultatio, his transgres-
sions, his denial of consensus reality, are all underwritten by a per-
verse form of enjoyment that frees his supporters from legal, rhetor-
ical, and psychic strictures. 
Other rhetorical scholars have attended to the political and emo-
tional environment that created the conditions for Trump’s civic trans-
gressions. Mary E. Stuckey suggests that Trump’s hyperboles and dis-
avowals are effective because they speak to a highly-charged “affective 
environment” in which political rhetoric is “unmoored from its insti-
tutional routines.”6 Trump’s rhetoric is “aimed at the viscera,” mean-
ing that institutionalized conventions and common virtues have lost 
their symbolic efficiency on account of the electorate’s oscillating dis-
illusionment with public institutions.7 Thought of this way, Trump’s 
rhetoric is not unique to this moment; yet his extraordinary transgres-
siveness makes visible and helps scholars account for the textual and 
contextual shifts that might animate his supporters. Indeed, Trump 
mobilizes affects and emotions to match, if not supersede, the tenor 
of his ideological directives. Scholars such as Kendall R. Phillips, Ma-
rina Levina, and Kumarini Silva take a slightly different approach by 
specifically addressing the subject of Trump’s expressions of cruelty, 
observing how the changing affective structures in American life have 
shifted so as to accommodate hatred and rage as acceptable expres-
sions of the political.8 Consider how the transformations in media, 
including the narrowcasting and fabrication of political information 
alongside the vitriol of talk radio, social media platforms, and reality 
television have created a welcoming environment for discourses un-
derwritten by divisiveness and cruelty.9 Denise M. Bostdorff takes on 
the subject of anger directly, arguing similarly that while Trump does 
not offer coherent arguments he does provide an intelligible emotional 
framework for his supporters that is both attuned to these shifts in 
the affective environment as well as the ways his audience is to re-
main in a state of perpetual anger.10 
Trump, as Bostdorff notes, nonetheless faces a series of rhetorical 
challenges, two of which are of central concern to this essay. First, 
Trump and his supporters have to reconcile their electoral victories 
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with their claims of political exile. Second, anger “can be exhausting 
and, once anger dissipates among the majority who are not dedicated 
true believers, the thirst for revenge can dissipate, too.”11 This essay 
addresses these two obstacles by reframing how Trump transforms 
short-lived yet intense emotions such as anger, along with paradoxical 
investments in the concept of white victimhood, into nearly inexhaust-
ible rhetorical resources. Taken together, I argue that Trump’s claims 
of victimhood and anger-laden calls for revenge seek out what philos-
opher Max Scheler called “the man [sic] of ressentiment,” or an audi-
ence who is seething with righteous anger and envy yet also suffering 
from the impotence to act or adequately express frustration.12 
Though anger and resentment capture part of Trump’s affective 
register, this essay suggests that the concept ressentiment accounts 
for the unique intersection where powerful sentiments and self-serv-
ing morality are coupled with feelings of powerlessness and rumina-
tions on past injuries. Whereas resentment can be characterized as bit-
ter indignation that one has been treated unfairly, ressentiment is a 
“self-poisoning of the mind” in which a subject is consumed by emo-
tions and affects such as “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse 
to detract, and spite.”13 Although both are reactive impulses, emo-
tions are often formed against definite objects and can be satiated 
by specific ideologically guided actions. Indeed, one of Trump’s chal-
lenges is sustaining the affective charge of revenge without dissipat-
ing the felt need for vengeance. Here, it is the impulse underlying the 
desire to detract or seek revenge that matters. Thus, I argue that res-
sentiment functions as a generative force—providing a link between 
emotions, ideology, and collective identity —that sustains the affective 
charge of detraction and revenge. My goal is to reframe Trump’s con-
stant detractions, disavowals, and impulse to revel in pain as parts 
of a broader emotional-moral framework that seeks to constantly re-
generate the felt intensities that underwrite demands for revenge and 
lamentations of victimhood. 
Ressentiment: an emotional-moral framework
When Donald J. Trump accepted the Republican nomination for 
president, he hailed an audience of angry yet noble sufferers—the for-
gotten, the downtrodden, the discarded, and the subjugated. He de-
clared with fiery incredulity: 
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Every day I wake up determined to deliver for the people I have 
met all across this nation that have been neglected, ignored, and 
abandoned. I have visited the laid-off factory workers, and the 
communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals. These 
are the forgotten men and women of our country. People who work 
hard but no longer have a voice. I AM YOUR VOICE!14 
Foregoing optimism and praise of the American character, Trump’s 
RNC address portrayed America as an apocalyptic wasteland strewn 
with the wreckage of abandoned factories and corroding infrastruc-
ture—held hostage and humiliated by a foreign occupying army of 
criminal gangs, illegal immigrants, and foreign competitors. Though 
doom is more typical of non-incumbent candidates, political commen-
tator Paul Begala playfully referenced President Reagan’s 1984 cam-
paign advertisement “Morning in America” to characterize Trump’s 
darker take as “midnight in America.”15 Of course, these themes are 
familiar to those who study populist rhetoric, for its many manifes-
tations consistently feature a virtuous people facing off against “fat 
cats” and powerbrokers.16 Yet, in Trump’s rhetoric, “the people” are 
substantially narrowed to a very particular cultural figure who might 
consider themselves aggrieved, grudge-holding, treated unfairly, pow-
erless, and humiliated by economic misfortune and other global forces 
outside of their control. 
As Johnson, Ott and Dickinson, and Terrill have illustrated, Trump’s 
demagoguery targets white Americans who feel anxious and victim-
ized by their impending displacement as the nation’s demographic ma-
jority. But we can discern other characteristics about Trump’s imag-
ined audience as well, or to use Edwin Black’s words, that which he 
“would have his real auditor become.”17 Simply put: Trump’s imagined 
audience is angry. They are angry because they suffer. They suffer be-
cause they are powerless. They are powerless because they are virtu-
ous. The country, they are told, has been unfairly taken from them. It 
is not simply that Trump intones resentment and rage but that he in-
vites his audience to see themselves as powerless and incapable of ad-
equately expressing their own frustrations. It is the suturing together 
of powerful feelings with a morally righteous subject position of weak-
ness that constitutes the political subject of ressentiment. With either 
power or ability to articulate their own desires, Trump demands to 
be his supporter’s surrogate: “I AM YOUR VOICE!” 
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Although each concept summons common sentiments, there are im-
portant analytical distinctions between ressentiment and resentment 
that help explain how Trump turns animus into a nearly inexhaust-
ible resource. While ressentiment is often the province of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and trauma studies, resentment is a term familiar to 
rhetoricians on account of its relationship with pathos. In his gene-
alogy of the concept, Jeremey Engels argues that resentment retains 
a dual character in U.S. democratic culture, representing misdirected 
enmity and hatred, on the one hand, and righteous indignation in the 
pursuit of social justice, on the other.18 Engels traces rhetoric’s un-
easy relationship with the concept starting from antiquity. He finds 
that Aristotle found resentment to be an ungovernable emotion—an 
undeniably negative civic feeling.19 Indeed, Isocrates feared that dem-
ocratic resentment would sow violence and discontent amongst the 
poor and might precipitate violence against the wealthy elites.20 En-
gels contends that “the philosophers of the classical period conceptu-
alized resentment as a bitter, eruptive, undignified force that has to be 
contained.”21 Yet, at their best, democracies are supposed to temper, 
manage, and channel the vicissitudes of resentment into passionate 
advocacy for the common good. Explaining the present forces of en-
mity, he avers that “much of the resentment felt today is the product 
of widespread feelings of powerlessness in the populous, along with 
the general sentiment that citizens are victims to forces and changes 
beyond their control.”22 Although I agree with this argument, I would 
add that the way Trump addresses his electorate places stress on the 
elasticity of democratic norms to effectively manage resentment to-
ward existing political institutions. He does so not by channeling re-
sentment alone but instead by suturing such sentiments to a moral 
framework and an identity formation in which suffering and revenge 
are inverted democratic virtues. And though resentment is the by-
product of feelings of powerlessness, Trump’s unique take on victim-
hood requires the persistence of a hostile external world to validate 
his claims to marginality—even as he continually boasts about his vic-
tories. Indeed, as I have argued, the therapeutic function of white vic-
timization rhetoric also belies any material standard by which claims 
of racial and economic injustice are to be adjudicated.23 
Ressentiment, then, captures the socially expressed state of mind, 
the ethical stance, and collective identity sought out by a form of 
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political rhetoric that links white victimization with virtue. If being 
a victim is the price of entry to his political ethos, then Trump must 
continually ruminate on his injuries, invent new tormentors and res-
urrect old ones, pursue ill-conceived policy goals, and perpetually de-
fer the resolution of their collective grievances. The suffering of his 
electorate takes precedence above all other considerations of justice. 
The thirst for revenge never dissipates. Thus, shifting focus from 
the rhetoric of resentment to that of ressentiment, I argue, explains 
how Trump is able to sustain the charge of animus without forfeit-
ing the moral high ground of victimhood to his audience’s “oppres-
sors”—Democrats, the press, criminals, immigrants, foreign adver-
saries, welfare recipients, the #MeToo movement, “globalists,” and 
racial Others. He can, therefore, exercise power on behalf of his elec-
torate without giving up his claim to the moral and emotional indig-
nation of the weak. 
A rhetoric of ressentiment engenders both moral and affective at-
tachments that invite subjects to ruminate on their wounds—real or 
perceived. The wound, in turn, becomes the source of the subject’s 
political identity. Friedrich Nietzsche argues ressentiment is an emo-
tional-moral framework in which the virtues of good and evil are re-
versed Where one is incapable of living up to a commonly agreed upon 
system of morality, ressentiment manifests in a reactive and inverted 
sense of virtue where one’s incapacity to act leads them to detract and 
devalue common virtues that are otherwise praiseworthy. For those 
afflicted, he writes, the wretched alone are the good; the suffering, 
deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, bless-
edness is for them alone – and you the powerful and noble are on the 
contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless of 
all eternity.25 
Although Nietzsche problematically characterizes ressentiment 
in terms of “slave morality,” this essay approaches ressentiment as 
a perversion of morality that leads subjects to mistakenly slander 
the common good as if their failure to embody such virtues repre-
sented structural oppression and thus justified their disavowal of civic 
responsibility.26 
Scheler elaborates by using the Aesop’s fable of the fox and the 
grapes to explain how ressentiment inverts common virtue.27 The fox, 
unable to reach the sweet grapes, attempts to save face by declar-
ing them sour. In other words, when denied a desired social good or 
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unable to perform a high civic virtue, the subject of ressentiment de-
tracts and devalues those goods rather than acknowledge their con-
ventionally accepted value. Ressentiment arises if emotions are pow-
erful but must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling 
that one is unable to act them out. This subject “tends to see injurious 
intentions in all kinds of perfectly innocent actions and remarks of 
others. Great touchiness is indeed frequently a symptom of a vengeful 
character.”28 Put another way, “injury is experienced as destiny.”29 Res-
sentiment is a peculiar affect because specific acts “cause no satisfac-
tion—they merely cause discontent, for they destroy the growing plea-
sure afforded by invective and negation.”30 Even where vengeance is 
fully achieved, enemies are effectively dispatched, and material power 
relations are reversed, ressentiment nonetheless engenders a funda-
mental lack that remains  a well spring of hatred and envy. Moreover, 
their fantasies of power must be kept at a distance if they are to sus-
tain the valorization and enjoyment of their invective.31 
In this framework, past injuries become central to the subject’s iden-
tity in the present. Where personal and collective identity hinge on the 
existence of hostile external world, a rhetoric of ressentiment seeks 
to cultivate investment and attachment to one’s own subjugation. For 
instance, Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” pre-
sumes an injury that must be overcome by restoring the subject to an 
imagined yet indeterminate time in which they were putatively whole. 
Thus, the identity constituted through the rhetoric of ressentiment is 
melancholic in that it continually revisits past injuries without ade-
quately mourning them. According to Freud, the melancholic subject 
cannot move forward because they compulsively re-experience the past 
as if it were happening in the present.32 Accordingly, Trump invites his 
audience to both ruminate on past injuries and idealize an indetermi-
nate time when they were un-fragmented subjects. But, as Barbara A. 
Biesecker argues, melancholia stages “the loss of an impossible object, 
ideal, or relation that the subject never had.”33 The temporal relation 
engendered by “again” is a conduit to an object that the subject never 
possessed and, thus, is a constitutive fantasy of the nation’s “greatness.” 
For this reason, Trump’s rhetoric evokes trauma; but this is a trauma 
that also concerns an object never lost, or those privileges neither re-
voked nor renounced by his white audience.34 Trump, however, levels 
all experiences of white vulnerability as traumatic, particularly in his 
hyperbolic characterization of daily violence in America. 
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Working from the French translation of resentment (ressentir), I 
wish to draw attention to the role of ressentiment in cultural politics 
of melancholia.35 Here we might characterize ressentiment as a pat-
tern of feeling in which a subject continually re-experiences a mem-
ory of a past or imagined sentiment, an injury or open psychic wound. 
Søren Kierkegaard surmised that “just as air in a sealed space becomes 
poisonous, so the imprisonment of reflection develops a culpable res-
sentiment if it is not ventilated by action or incident of any kind.”36 
Ressentiment is an impediment to moving forward because it directs 
the subject’s gaze backwards, tethering the self to ruminations of past 
injuries. Wendy Brown suggests that such ruminations forge identi-
ties that make the past necessarily unredeemable.37 For Sarah Ahmed, 
the fetishization of wounds has the tendency to excise past injuries 
from history and fold them into the psyche.38 Complicating matters 
further, white victimhood rhetoric is largely unconcerned with adju-
dicating the structural nature of injustice. The long-standing effort to 
paint white Americans, white men in particular, as victims erases the 
material distinction between real structural inequality and indigna-
tion that arises from felt intensities.39 
The insight offered by a concept such as ressentiment is that it cap-
tures the confluence between emotions, affects, morality, and identity 
that seem to have reached a crescendo at the outset of the Trump pres-
idency. The nascent rhetorical scholarship on Trump would benefit 
from theoretical consonance between public shared emotions and 
modes of moral judgment that are co-constituted in contemporary 
rhetoric of the presidency. I characterize ressentiment as a phenome-
non caught up in the entanglements between emotions, ideology, and 
affiliation. Indeed, though Aristotle suggests that the tendency of an-
ger is toward action (revenge), when it is enveloped by moral frame-
work of victimhood, anger is instead committed to the audience’s dis-
empowerment. A rhetorical theory of ressentiment accounts for the 
parsimony between Trump’s ideological discourse and emotional en-
tailments—helping characterize the paradoxical but mutually reinforc-
ing relationship between virtue and victimhood. 
Although this essay, in part, concerns the singular rhetorical pe-
culiarities of the early Trump presidency, I suggest that we are wit-
nessing a much more significant transformation in modes of political 
address that account for the culture of spectatorship to which Trump 
seems attuned. His indulgence in cruelty, revenge, and victimhood are 
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in sync with the melodramatic norms of reality television and the vit-
riolic media ecology of social networking. As Ott and Dickinson argue, 
Trump’s manner of address, particularly his appeals to white rage, are 
well-suited to mediums that engender impulsivity, simplicity, narcis-
sism, and incivility.40 As I illustrate in the following section, Trump’s 
rallies carry the warped sense of civic virtue cultivated by reality tele-
vision and social networks into the office of the presidency. Trump 
addresses an electorate already accustomed to such perverse norms. 
But ressentiment is not only a timely theory, it is also one that ad-
dresses the perennial concerns of rhetorical theorists that traces back 
to Plato’s critique of rhetoric as merely a speaker’s knack for creating 
pleasing appearances, capitalizing on mercurial emotions, and playing 
demagogue with neither expert knowledge of nor concern for truth. 
Thus, I conclude that ressentiment offers rhetorical theory an account 
of how dominant groups contain progressive expansions of public mo-
rality by debasing the very concept of civic virtue itself. 
The man of ressentiment
In what follows, I analyze the agonistic drama that unfolds in 
Trump’s address to his supporters, attending to the way he repeat-
edly chains out fantasies of persecution that ennoble both him and his 
audience. I note throughout a series of value inversions, haphazard 
and poorly-planned objectives, and undefeatable enemies that render 
Trump and his supporters virtuous suffers, entitled to their revenge. 
Yet, I conclude that this underlying psychical structure of ressenti-
ment ultimately disempowers his audience by extorting from them 
a perpetual deferral of agency to one man: Trump, their surrogate. 
President Trump’s post-election rallies are spectacular, emotionally-
charged events. Large amphitheaters and jubilant crowds recreate the 
atmosphere of a rock concert, a wrestling match, or music festival. En-
thusiastic supporters don all manner of Trump-themed merchandise 
and clothing items, including the now iconic “Make American Great 
Again” red trucker-style hats. The presence of the press and cameras 
conveys the sense that these are singular newsworthy events. Intro-
duced by theme music, Trump takes the stage. A carefully curated au-
dience is arranged behind the president to enable the cameras to cap-
ture audience member’s emotional reactions to Trump’s transgressive 
comments. 
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Despite the celebration, the president’s rallies are also oddly ambiv-
alent events. On the one hand, they are epideictic occasions in which 
Trump recounts his many victories and accolades while also prais-
ing the virtues of his supporters—namely their loyalty. On the other, 
Trump also ruminates on the ways he and his supporters have been 
treated unfairly, warns of potential victimization around every turn, 
searches out antagonisms and roadblocks, re-litigates old feuds, holds 
grudges, invents powerful enemies, and fantasizes about committing 
acts of cruelty. Though his rallies generate an extraordinary amount 
of text, the  themes throughout seldom vary. Examining a selection of 
post-election rallies helps illustrate how Trump is able to continually 
addle his audience into understanding themselves as at once powerful 
and victimized. It is at his rallies where Trump commiserates with his 
loyal supporters and delivers to them an understanding of their sub-
ject position as embattled. His proclamations of victory are subdued 
by undertones of both personal and collective frustration. 
Trump’s pain, or the sufferer-in-chief
Although he regularly observes the suffering of his forgotten elec-
torate, according to Trump no one suffers more than he. Even when 
responding to national tragedies or crises, Trump is quick to remind 
his supporters of his martyrdom. For instance, following a statement 
addressing assassination attempts against highly-visible Democrats, 
Trump used the occasion to point out that no one is more maligned 
than himself. Speaking at the White House to attendees at Turning 
Point USA’s Young Black Leadership Summit, Trump concluded his 
official remarks with a series of off-the-cuff and out-of-place state-
ments that are characteristic of his political free verse.41 Most strik-
ingly, he told the group, “[w]e all get attacked … Who gets attacked 
more than me? … I can do the greatest thing for our country, and on 
the networks, it will play bad.”42 This short aside illustrates how Trump 
uses public controversies and moments of national grieving as occa-
sions to reflect on the ways in which he has been wronged. Defying the 
collective demands of the epideictic, Trump’s frequently centers him-
self above the occasion. He monopolizes grief—turning himself into a 
synecdoche for the elisions and perceived insults faced by his support-
ers. He also levels and equivocates slights by the media and his political 
opponents with the systematic discrimination faced by women, people 
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of color, and GLTBQ communities. His use of the pronoun “we” could 
mean a sense in which attacks are a part of our universal vulnerabil-
ity, or it could infer a particularity that he believes he shares with his 
African American audience. In either case, victimhood is robbed of its 
material referents and reduced to a therapeutic discourse used to ar-
ticulate and refract white suffering through the  prism of identity pol-
itics. Finally, Trump presents himself as somewhat agentless in rela-
tion to his most frequently referenced enemy: the news media, or in 
his words, the “fake news.” He asserts that despite his nation-saving 
agenda, the press will never give him his fair due. They are a relent-
less and omnipotent entity that continues to victimize both him and 
his supporters. Trump articulates his struggle as both commensurate 
with other forms of structural inequality and unending because his en-
emies are bent on portraying him in a negative light. 
Trump often searches out the suffering of others with whom he can 
analogize his own victimization—maligned figures such as Joe Arpaio, 
Admiral Ronny Jackson, and Brett Kavanaugh to name a few. In refer-
ence to the aggressive public vetting of Admiral Jackson for the head 
of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Trump opined, One of the sad-
dest things I’ve seen is when Jon Tester and what he did to a great, 
great man, Admiral Ronnie Jackson. Admiral Jackson was subjected 
to horrible lies and smears. Now, I’m, you know, a victim of that, too, 
but I’m sort of getting used to it.43 
At a rally in Mississippi, Trump devoted a significant amount of 
time to the parallels between his own struggles and the so-called false 
accusations of sexual assault leveled against then Supreme Court Nom-
inee Justice Brett Kavanaugh. He implored, think of your son. Think 
of your husband. Think – I’ve had many false accusations. I’ve had it 
all the – I’ve had so many – and when I say it didn’t happen, nobody 
believes me. But it’s me. It’s my job description.44 
After establishing the similarity between the way both were treated 
by the press and Democrats, Trump goes on to describe Kavanaugh as 
an innocent victim and his accuser Professor Christine Blasely Ford as 
a suspect. He remarked, “This woman had no clue what was going on. 
No clue. And yet she made the most horrible charges against a num-
ber one in his class at Yale, perfect human being, great father, great 
husband. This is a great person.”45 For Trump, the injustices that el-
evate to his attention frequently involve accomplished or privileged 
people, such as himself, who have been unfairly treated. 
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Trump expresses empathy with individuals such as Jackson and Ka-
vanaugh because they are fallen public figures whose innocence and 
powerlessness he believes reflect his own. He suggests that he knows, 
too, what it is like to be treated unfairly. He asks the audience to think 
of him the way they would other important men in their lives: their 
sons, brothers, fathers, and now president. Imagine, he implores, what 
it is like to be him— not what it is like to be a victim of sexual assault. 
But for Trump, precarity and unfair treatment do not reference expe-
riences of structural oppression but instead moments when the en-
titlements and privileges of a “great man” and a “perfect human be-
ing” are put at risk by entering the public eye. This explains how and 
why Trump diverts attention from the claims of the aggrieved to fo-
cus on the suffering of the accused. If, as Isocrates warned, the out-
side world is afflicting with animus toward the elite, then those at the 
top have the most to fear.46 Since he invites his audience to consider 
the position of the accuser as a subject always-already infused with 
resentment, he casts doubt on their claims to victimhood. It is no co-
incidence that the only public apology he has ever issued was to Jus-
tice Kavanaugh: “On behalf of our nation, I want to apologize to Brett 
and the entire Kavanaugh family for the terrible pain and suffering 
you have been forced to endure.”47 For Trump, only the claims of the 
accused carry weight. In this way, Trump helps himself and his sup-
porters corner the market on innocence. 
It is important to note that he concludes each of these examples 
with a common lament that these false attacks are ultimately his cross 
to bear. In other words, Trump relates to these cases not only because 
they were his nominees but, by his own estimation, they have been 
cast as scapegoats by the left. To counter their unrelenting assault on 
his administration, Trump identifies himself as a martyr, a strong and 
valiant character who will bear the load for others. Observing how the 
press used to adore him, he claims, [t]hey used to treat me so good 
too, until I ran for office. I used to get the greatest publicity. A friend 
of mine said, “You know, you used to be the king of getting great pub-
licity. What happened?” I said, “Well, I have some views that they’re 
opposed to for a lot of bad reasons.”48 
Not surprisingly, Trump reads bad press as an expression of self-
interested political cynicism. Elsewhere he noted, “On the way over 
here, I saw a liberal pundit. He was filled with anger. And he was at-
tacking me and our great administration. We have great people. I’ll 
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tell you, the White House is really working good.” 49 His response to 
criticism is often incredulous. He expresses surprise and dismay that 
the press would deny and detract from the good work he believes is 
being done by his administration. Here lies a remarkable similarity 
between bad press coverage and his empathy with the accused: that 
much like allegations of wrongdoing, criticism of his administration 
is itself a denial of due process. Hence, he often adopts a perpetrator’s 
perspective on social justice. 
Despite the purported unfairness of his opponents’ criticism, Trump 
offers to take the blows for supporters. Trump routinely posits that he 
can withstand an extraordinary amount of abuse. Calling himself and 
his supporters “warriors” he suggests that warriors can take abuse: 
There’s another warrior in the room. These are warriors. Look, the 
abuse they take, the abuse we all take, if you’re not a warrior, you just 
go home, go to the corner, put your thumb in your mouth and say, 
“Mommy, take me home.”50 
Illustrated here, Trump often characterizes his masculinity in ab-
ject terms. Put differently, he embodies a form of masculinity that is 
valorized for its capacity to suffer.51 Warriors enjoy their suffering be-
cause it is a mark of virtue and stoic pride, as opposed to the emas-
culated man who sucks his thumb and cries to his mother. According 
to Trump, only he can save his supporters through a noble sacrifice. 
In his RNC address he portrayed himself as a benevolent protector, 
motivated not by his own political interests but “so that the powerful 
can no longer beat up on people that cannot defend themselves.”52 In 
defense of his statement addressing the violence at Charlottesville in 
2017, he asserted that “[t]he media can attack me. But where I draw 
the line is when they attack you, which is what they do. When they 
attack the decency of our supporters.”53 In addition to the overt dis-
avowal of responsibility for the racist violence on display at the Unite 
the Right rally, Trump represented himself as a benevolent protector 
of the virtuous citizenry against the bad faith of their opponents. In 
short, he inscribed martyrdom onto the “ ” of the presidency. 
Embracing the cultural logics of white male sacrifice enables Trump 
to address his audience as traumatized subjects who can be redeemed 
and made whole again through ritual victim age. Indeed, Kenneth 
Burke’s description of cycles of guilt, victim age, sacrifice, and re-
demption would suggest that Trump’s rhetoric symbolically excises 
evil and imperfection via ritual purification.54 More specifically, we 
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might also understand how this rhetorical choice foregrounds the 
white male body in pain as the exemplar citizen-subject. Thus, the 
staging of Trump’s pain, to use Claire Sisco King’s words, constitutes 
a “restaging traumatic loss so that catastrophe may be refigured as re-
demption, renewal, and rebirth.”55 In other words, Trump reconfigures 
suffering and victimhood as exemplars of virtuous leadership and the 
performance of which entitles he and his supporters to something 
more grandiose than their present circumstances. 
A fitting example of this sacrificial logic is in how Trump ad-
dresses the #MeToo movement. In his remarks about false allega-
tions, he expressed righteous indignation about what he considers 
to be a superlative inversion of due process. For him, the catastro-
phe is that virtuous subjects might be stripped of their privileges 
and social entitlements. The accusations against Kavanaugh, a “per-
fect human being,” he argues, “violates every notion of fairness, de-
cency, and due process.”56 When discussing Kavanaugh at his rallies, 
he often employs terms that prompt the audience to think of him as 
vulnerable, weak, and feminized. Kavanaugh’s victimhood is both 
exemplified and amplified by the collateral damage inflicted on his 
wife and daughter. For instance, Trump claims that “a man’s life is 
in tatters. A man’s life is shattered. His wife is shattered. His daugh-
ters, who are beautiful, incredible young kids—they destroy people. 
They want to destroy people. These are really evil people.”57 Kavana-
ugh and his family are traumatic subjects par excellence; “perfect” 
and “beautiful” people “shattered,” “tattered,” and “destroyed” by 
the left. Discussing Kavanaugh in relation to feminine figures such 
as his wife and daughters exaggerates his innocence and precarity 
while also making out Blasey Ford and the press to be the real pred-
ators. He goes on to argue that: 
Guilty until proven innocent. That’s very dangerous for our coun-
try. And I have it myself all the time. But for me, it’s like a part of 
the job description. Let it happen to me. Shouldn’t happen to him. 
Shouldn’t happen to him.58 
Such statements are illustrative of how Trump establishes his quasi-
religious moral character. In one sense, he suggests that his primary 
virtue is sacrifice. Yet, this statement also exemplifies Trump’s inver-
sion of the collective good. 
C.R .  Kelly  in  Quarterly  Journal  of  Speech  106  (2020)      17
In Trump’s rhetoric, it is his pain and his struggles that ultimately 
matter. It is for this reason that Trump’s rhetoric is primarily con-
cerned with a self-serving conception of justice. He is preoccupied 
with the vulnerability of privileged people who have much to lose, 
not, for instance, the virtues of precarious communities victimized by 
sexual assault and harassment, domestic abuse, mass incarceration, 
police brutality, or discrimination by the judicial system. Second, de-
spite all the institutional and financial advantages at his call, Trump 
suggests that he is as much a victim of false accusations and unfair 
treatment as anyone else, regardless of material circumstances. In 
this case, being accused of wrongdoing is commensurate with being 
victimized by wrongdoing. Finally, he offers himself up as a sacrifice 
on behalf of his beleaguered supporters. This pattern of victimization 
and sacrifice invites his audience to identify as survivors of cultural 
trauma who are redeemed through Trump’s martyrdom. Of course, 
the biggest victim in any national tragedy is himself. But Trump pres-
ents his own suffering as unique and unable to be fully relayed to his 
supporters. When addressing criticisms of his immigration policy, he 
notes: 
And think of it in terms of immigration. And you may love it, or 
you may say, isn’t that terrible. Okay? And if you say isn’t that ter-
rible, who cares? Because the way they treat me – that’s peanuts 
compared to the way they treat me. Okay?59 
This lament suggests that Trump’s woes extend well beyond what is 
visible to his supporters. Fortunately for them, Trump assures, he has 
an extraordinary capacity to withstand pain. 
If ressentiment is characterized by feelings of powerlessness and 
ineffability, then no one act of redemption can dissipate powerful 
emotions such as hate and envy. Indeed, Trump’s sacrifice is unend-
ing because his victimhood is predicated on the relentlessness of an 
undefeatable foe. As the above examples illustrate, Trump suggests 
that no matter what he does the enemy attacks. This represents the 
ambivalence of ressentiment: one must continually re-experience 
humiliations over and over again to build a reservoir of anger. Al-
though Trump boasts about his victories, he must constantly unset-
tle his audience’s sense of contentment. He must present himself as 
hamstrung, foiled and powerless so that resentment may transform 
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into a wellspring of intense frustration directed at Trump’s opponents. 
Trump is able to maintain his electorate’s political exile by con-
structing an array of evasive and cunning foes. Despite a conserva-
tive majority in all three branches of government during the first two 
years of his presidency, Trump consistently represents himself and 
his supporters as a fragile and tenuous minority. The power of his en-
emies is unseen, conspiratorial, and elusive. For instance, he argues 
that “they’re the old and corrupt, globalist, ruling class that squan-
dered trillions of dollars on foreign adventures.”60 In another excerpt, 
Trump exclaims that “Today’s Democrat Party is held hostage by left-
wing haters, angry mobs, deep state radicals, establishment cronies, 
and their fake news allies. Our biggest obstacle and their greatest ally 
actually is the media.”61 In one of his more explicit nods to right-wing 
conspiracy theories, Trump references the threat of “Unelected deep-
state operatives who defy the voters to push their own secret agen-
das [who] are truly a threat to democracy itself.”62 In another passage 
worth quoting at length, he claims: 
But it’s all fragile. The Democrats will open our borders to deadly 
drugs and ruthless gangs … Radical Democrats want to tear down 
our laws, tear down our institutions in pursuit of power, demolish 
our prosperity in the name of socialism and probably worse … and 
abolish our borders in the service of globalism. There is nothing 
Democrats aren’t willing to do, and you’re seeing it day by day, and 
you’ve seen it more the last week than you’ve ever seen it before. 
And no one – just think of this. No one under any circumstances 
is allowed to speak up if you’re on this side of the equation. But 
guess what? We’re speaking up like nobody has ever spoken up 
before. They want to get the power that they so desperately crave 
that was taken away from them. All of the Democrats know and 
all they really know how to do is obstruct, resist, demolish, de-
stroy and delay.63 
These examples illuminate the characteristics of Trump’s undefeat-
able foe. First, the Democrats and the press are part of a “ruling class” 
that extracts wealth from his supporters to bolster a corrupt regime 
of power. Although Trump rarely misses an opportunity to brag about 
his affluence, he relates to class not as if it were one’s position within 
a spectrum of wealth stratification but rather as a style or point of 
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identification. This allows Trump to tout his successes while simul-
taneously lambasting his “elite” tormentors. For instance, when dis-
cussing his superior intelligence and educational background relative 
to the press, Trump vaunts “I have a better education than they do 
from a much better school, but—the elite. They’re the elite. They’re 
the elite.”64 He inverts terms such as “ruling class” and “elite” to ref-
erence not self-proclaimed billionaires such as himself but instead an 
abstract group of invisible power brokers allied with the media and 
hell bent on promoting “globalist” interests. Constant victories aside, 
he encourages his audience to not underestimate the power of the en-
emy. Instead of belittling the weakness of the minority party, he sug-
gests that their networks of power are global in scope. References to 
“globalism” suggest a vast international conspiracy to make the United 
States subject to world government.65 
Second, these enemies are addled by irrational hatred, anger, and 
radicalism. Hence, they will not be hamstrung by existing institutions 
and the rule of law. He draws on terms such as “deep state radicals” 
and “obstructionists” to construct his electorate as virtuous outsiders 
who, being uncorrupted by the system, must remain vigilant against 
a camouflaged yet powerful adversary. This helps reconcile his audi-
ence’s outsider identity and keep alive an enemy at which he can con-
tinually direct their anger. Finally, he suggests that he and his virtuous 
supporters have been silenced by the opposition. An indirect reference 
to the lightening rod of “political correctness,” Trump contends that 
these enemies lack civic virtue because they do not respect the basic 
tenets of free speech, the rule of law, and democratic decision-making. 
In this way, Trump effectively projects onto his adversaries the very 
attributes the press has characterized his own administration. More-
over, he effectively disavows his own power and status while crafting 
an adversary worthy of his audience’s ire. 
Trump’s revenge, or the avenger-in-chief
Trump claims to feel his audience’s pain. In his inaugural address, 
he envisioned America as a nation under siege by foreign enemies, 
citizens robbed of their dignity, and mothers and children suffering 
needlessly. His address was geared toward those who saw themselves 
as downtrodden, forgotten, and hopeless: 
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Mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities, 
rusted-out factories, scattered like tombstones across the land-
scape of our nation, an education system flush with cash, but, 
which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of knowl-
edge, and the crime, and the gangs, and the drugs that have sto-
len too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized 
potential. This American carnage stops right here and stops right 
now. We are one nation and their pain is our pain. Their dreams 
are our dreams and their success will be our success. We share one 
heart, one home, and one glorious destiny.66 
Here, the nation is unified by shared traumas. His description of 
“American carnage” imports the pain of others into the nation’s “glo-
rious destiny.” Trump not only speaks to the felt pain of his audience, 
he socializes and circulates these negative affects into public life. The 
particular and visceral pain of an unemployed coal miner, then, can 
become the vicarious sympathy pain of his more-well-off electorate. 
He appropriates the pain of the most vulnerable among his electorate 
to justify policies that will likely result in their further impoverish-
ment. This is pain detached from particular bodies, rendered an ab-
stract idea that on its own can generate great anger amongst a more 
universal audience. Here, Trump channels that suffering into an imag-
ined political community. Many in Trump’s electorate may not be the 
forgotten; nonetheless, they are entitled to the indignation that ac-
companies the injuries of others. 
As I note earlier, several scholars have addressed Trump’s victim-
ized audience. Indeed, the above example is illustrative of Trump’s 
efforts to address Americans as oppressed and mistreated—not by 
structural racism, gender inequality, or class exploitation—but by for-
eign Others: immigrants, MS-13, China, “globalists,” and Islamic ter-
rorists. To elaborate instead on his rhetoric of ressentiment, I wish to 
pause on the place of revenge and retributive justice in Trump’s emo-
tional-moral framework. Put another way, how do fantasies of re-
venge both sustain the charge of anger while also rendering his audi-
ence mute and powerless? At the 2018 Conservative Political Action 
Conference, Trump stated plainly his approach to justice. Simply put, 
“[p]eople that treat us badly, we treat them much worse than they 
could ever imagine. That’s the way it has to be. That’s the way it has 
to be.”67 At his rallies, Trump typically meanders through a list of en-
emies—old and new—and chains out fantasies of retribution. But the 
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revenge he calls for need not serve a particular end. Revisiting cru-
elty on others is its own reward. This circular moral reasoning of cru-
elty for cruelty’s sake never dissipates the animus that generates the 
felt need for revenge. Revenge does not solve anything and it does not 
need to. Revenge appeals work by acclimating audiences to violence 
and relieving them of any guilt associated with enjoying or partici-
pating in acts of cruelty. 
In some cases, Trump’s endorsement of retribution is overt. This is 
particularly true when he addresses protestors at his rallies. At a 2016 
rally in Las Vegas, he responded to a protestor being removed by ask-
ing, “Do you know what they used to do to guys like that when they’re 
in a place like this? They’d be carried out on a stretcher, folks.” To the 
crowd’s delight, he later added “I’d like to punch him in the face, I tell 
ya.”68 When a protestor at another event yelled “Black Lives Matter” 
he pined nostalgically that, you know, in the old days — which isn’t 
so long ago — when we were less politically correct, that kind of stuff 
wouldn’t have happened. Today we have to be so nice, so nice, we al-
ways have to be so nice.69 
At another rally he urged his audience to “knock the crap out of 
him … I promise you, I will pay your legal fees.”70 The problem of dis-
sent, he surmised, was that there were no consequences for protestors 
because “no one wants to hurt each other anymore.”71 In one sense, 
Trump clearly transgresses taboos against the open endorsement of 
political violence in a democratic culture. He carves out a zone of ex-
ception for his supporters that relieves them of their legal and civic 
obligations. Under exception, slights and injuries—even ones of lit-
tle consequence—can and should be met with an equal if not dispro-
portionate measure of retributive violence. Read through the concept 
of ressentiment, such statements also illustrate the inner workings 
of a reactive morality, formed in the negative that is so hollow that 
its animosity can never be satisfied. In other words, this articulation 
of revenge is neither efficacious nor proportional. Revenge is simply 
morally correct: cruelty is for its own sake. Writing for The Atlantic, 
Adam Serwer argued that what Trump’s cruelty does achieve is the 
binding together of his electorate in the collective enjoyment of oth-
ers suffering. He writes that “it is not just that the perpetrators of 
this cruelty enjoy it; it is that they enjoy it with one another. Their 
shared laughter at the suffering of others is an adhesive that binds 
them to one another, and to Trump.”72 Indeed, the crowd responds 
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with cathartic laughter as Trump releases them from the burdens of 
empathy and cultivates affective bonds based on the shared enjoy-
ment of other people’s pain. The function of cruelty, then, is less in-
strumental than it is constitutive. 
It is not simply that Trump demands retribution for injuries com-
mitted against him and his electorate—to be sure, he does—but that 
he contorts revenge into a civic virtue. Thus, Trump inverts the Quin-
tilian virtues of the “good [person] speaking well” by elevating the 
wronged person claiming their right to revenge. He heralds violence 
over pacifism; enmity over respect; competition over cooperation; 
hyperbole over truth; and bad faith over good will. Indeed, as Sche-
ler warns, the man of ressentiment … wreaks vengeance on the idea 
whose test he cannot stand by pulling it down to the level of his fac-
tual condition. Thus his awareness of sin and nothingness explodes 
the beautiful structure of the world of values, debasing the idea for 
the sake of an illusory cure.73 
As such, in Trump’s upturn of democratic virtue, the nation is great 
not for its compassion but its extraordinary capacity to inflict pain on 
its enemies. Particularly when discussing immigration, Trump touts 
his administration’s use of violence against criminal gangs. He ob-
serves that “We are dismantling and destroying the bloodthirsty crim-
inal gangs, and well, I will just tell you in, we’re not doing it in a polit-
ically correct fashion. We’re doing it rough. Our guys are rougher than 
their guys.”74 Here, Trump extends the concept of political correctness 
beyond the constraints of appropriate and inclusive language to in-
clude formal prohibitions against the use of excessive force and viola-
tions of due process. “Doing it rough,” as it were, means “destroying” 
the nation’s enemies by dispensing with burdensome rules governing 
the fair treatment of immigrants and criminal suspects. 
Whereas previous Republican presidents praised American excep-
tionalism (problematically so) as a beacon of hope to the rest of the 
world, Trump’s America is exceptional because it is above the law, 
tougher and rougher than any potential rival. But he did not stop 
there. Trump continued by telling an anecdote in which he asked a 
general to describe for him the toughness of ICE. He recalled, I asked 
one of our great generals, “how tough are our people? How tough are 
they?” He said, “sir, you don’t want to know about it.” Then I saw one 
guy come out, a customs officer who is a monster. I said, “so general, 
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you think I could take that guy in a fight?” He said, “Mr. President, sir 
I don’t even want to think about it.” I said “you’re right, actually.”75 
For Trump, it is this unimaginable capacity to inflict pain that is 
the nation’s greatest asset. His calls for revenge are also constructed 
in terms associated with physical toil and domination. For example, 
he emphasized law enforcement’s enhanced ability to use excessive 
force: ICE, we call ICE, and they go into those towns, and they grab 
those guys by the neck and they throw them into those paddy wag-
ons. They couldn’t care less. And you don’t want to do it. And you don’t 
want to do it.76 
Elsewhere he bragged that we are throwing MS-13 the hell out of 
“here so fast” and that “General Kelly’s great people … come in and 
grab the thugs and throw them the hell out.”77 These tales of exces-
sive force enable his audience to imagine having power over foreign 
Others, or to render the nation’s enemies helpless and physically sub-
missive to a more dominant and masculine power. He praises neither 
restraint nor respect for life but rather our monstrous capability to 
exceed the cruelty of others. 
Perhaps the most palpable revenge fantasies involve Trump’s elec-
toral opponent Hillary Clinton. At his rallies, mere mention of “crooked 
Hillary” prompts reflexive jeers and chants of the slogan “Lock Her 
Up!” In yet another inversion of democratic norms, Trump has rou-
tinely called for the jailing of his political opponent: “Hillary Clinton 
has to go to jail. She has to go to jail.”78 During a presidential debate 
he claimed, “If I win, I am going to instruct my attorney general to 
get a special prosecutor to look into your situation. There has never 
been so many lies, deception—there has never been anything like it.”79 
Elsewhere he noted that his supporters demand it, “When I go out 
and speak, the people of this country are furious. In my opinion, the 
people who have been long-term workers at the FBI are furious.”80 
Read in light of Trump’s masculinized calls for meanness and tough-
ness as virtues, the call to “lock her up” constitutes a particularly lu-
rid fantasy of feminine submission. The demand envisions Clinton as 
a domineering shrew rendered helpless and vulnerable to the phys-
ical coercion of a resurgent masculine public. Indeed, Trump is fond 
of recalling the pleasure of besting his female opponent. At one rally 
he recalls, “That felt good. Pretty recently. Okay. Now I have the privi-
lege of going against crooked Hillary Clinton. So I beat, I beat crooked 
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Hillary.”81 The thought of beating or jailing Clinton channels feelings 
of outrage into a concrete fantasy of control over a superlatively evil 
and cunning opponent. 
But, with ressentiment, emotions are ultimately suppressed and 
fantasies of revenge are perpetually deferred. Indeed, in Scheler’s 
words, Trump’s rhetoric “cannot escape the tormenting conflict be-
tween desire and impotence.”82 Much like MS-13 or China, Clinton 
constitutes an impassable obstacle, an undefeatable foe whose pres-
ence confirms the existence of a hostile external world. Hence, Trump 
paradoxically suggests that he is also powerless to defeat her. Noting 
how the media ignores his pleas to investigate her crimes, he explains 
“You can have the biggest story about Hillary Clinton—I mean, look 
at what she’s getting away with. But let’s see if she gets away with 
it. Let’s see.”83 Although he has asserted elsewhere that he would im-
prison Hillary, here he oddly suggests a more passive wait-and-see 
approach. But he explains that it is his power that ironically prevents 
him from delivering the final blow: 
The saddest thing is, because I’m the president of the United 
States, I am not supposed to be involved in the Justice Depart-
ment. I am not supposed to be involved in the FBI … I’m not sup-
posed to be doing the kind of things that I would love to be doing 
and I’m very frustrated by it.84 
Trump’s calls for retribution against Clinton are powerful because 
they can never be fully satisfied. In one sense, jailing Clinton would 
dissipate the enjoyment of calling for her to be jailed. As Scheler re-
minds us, such criticism “does not want to cure the evil: the evil is 
merely a pretext for criticism.”85 Moreover, Trump’s inability to carry 
out his audience’s desire for revenge helps aggregate frustration and 
indignation so as to keep anger in constant circulation. Ressentiment 
arises when emotions are powerful but must be suppressed because 
they cannot be acted upon. In this case, Trump cultivates hostile emo-
tions that give rise to the desire for vengeance but without providing 
his audience with a sense of resolution or power to act on their felt 
intensities. Yet, this is exactly the point: the felt need for vengeance 
never dissipates and the list of hostile enemies and tormentors grows 
without end. 
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The age of ressentiment
This essay argues that a theory of ressentiment illustrates how the 
contemporary rhetoric of white victimhood has cultivated an affective 
political environment wherein rage is a renewable rhetorical resource. 
President Trump’s appeals to suffering and revenge reach beyond the 
politics of resentment, which can be both mercurial and fleeting, to a 
politics of ressentiment that hails a subject addled by feelings of an-
ger and powerlessness. Ressentiment represents an emotional-moral 
framework that sustains an audience’s desire for vengeance but also 
an investment in their own marginalization. Although Trump at-
tempts to cultivate ressentiment, this does mean that he is ineffective 
in achieving policy victories or selling his agenda to his electorate. In 
fact, quite the opposite. Invective, negation, and detraction are power-
ful tropes that enable their user to undermine taken-for-granted vir-
tues and create new and self-serving standards of moral judgment. In-
deed, while a theory of ressentiment explains that perverse appeal of 
Trump’s rhetoric, the motives of Trump supporters seem to confound 
the press.86 Perplexed by his transgressive behavior, their incredulous 
response to his perversity continues to be “this is not normal!” To a 
certain extent, they are correct. Trump has not only unhinged his sup-
porters from civil obligation, he has inverted the very concept of civic 
virtue itself. It should come as no surprise, then, that when Trump de-
cries his victimhood and calls for vengeance against his enemies that 
his supporters remain enthusiastic. 
As Gunn has suggested, rhetoricians should attend to the structures 
of enjoyment that maintain the affective charge of Trump’s refusal 
to obey civic conventions.87 Along these lines, I have argued that res-
sentiment illustrates some additional registers that help explain how 
Trump is able to maintain his audience’s claim to marginality while 
sustaining their anger at the very elite institutions he occupies. More-
over, ressentiment explains the rhetorical work of Trump’s embrace 
of the profane, the taboo, and the unvirtuous. Reading Trump’s rhet-
oric through the theory of ressentiment explains the rhetorical im-
plications of when prolonged frustration, envy, and vengeance meet 
powerful sentiments of victimhood and powerlessness. Ressentiment 
keeps its audience’s attention and hatred focused on an external world 
that is hostile to their interests and values. 
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Though his rhetoric of suffering and revenge successfully aggre-
gates anger to legitimize his actions and cultivate support, this es-
say suggests that he ultimately renders his audience powerless. First, 
in adopting the role of suffering martyr, Trump becomes a transcen-
dent figure whose sacrifice offers his audience an illusory sense of 
redemption and wholeness. Yet, the emotional-moral framework he 
offers permits no one act to erase the desire for vengeance. More-
over, there was never a time in which his predominantly white sup-
porters were ever whole. Although he offers to suffer in the name of 
his electorate, his suffering is ultimately self-empowerment. He so-
cializes and circulates the pain of others so that it is accessible and 
useable to his affluent electorate. It becomes his pain and his strug-
gles that take precedence over all else, and by his estimation no one 
suffers more than he. 
Second, hailed as perpetually slighted and ignored, Trump locates 
in his audience their virtue as passive marginalized subjects. He em-
phasizes how they are forgotten, demoralized, attacked, and dispos-
sessed of their birth rights. It is for these reasons that they are enti-
tled to their revenge. Although Trump continually erects new barriers 
to achieving their goals and locates new enemies to blame for their 
circumstances, this does not prevent his supporters from pursuing 
victory by their own means. Ressentiment cultivates political power-
lessness but does not preclude individual acts of vengeance. The 2018 
attempted bombings directed at prominent Democrats is a case-in-
point. Trump-supporter Cesar Sayoc allegedly sent improvised explo-
sive devices to a group of enemies frequently referenced by Trump at 
his rallies, including Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Eric 
Holder, and George Soros.88 As Engels notes, the constant sowing of 
discontent has dangerous consequences. It can test the ability of dem-
ocratic culture to channel resentment into the productive indignation 
toward inequality. Ressentiment encourages individuals to divest from 
the civic good and ennoble their own suffering, however mundane or 
contrived. Ressentiment prevents subjects from moving forward be-
cause their gaze is cast backward toward re-experiencing an injury. 
Trump directs his audience’s anger toward settling old scores, litigat-
ing past wrongs, and resurrecting new enemies. In the case of Trump’s 
audience, the collective injury is those social and economic changes 
that have supposedly displaced white America. He creates a political 
community forged through and invested in its own marginalization. 
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Trump’s appeals to victimhood and revenge exemplifies how ressen-
timent acts as an anti-democratic and anti-progressive force. Ressen-
timent is the animating political force of this precarious political mo-
ment and will ultimately test the elasticity of democratic culture to 
contain and channel the forces of resentment. 
Finally, this essay suggests that the rhetoric of ressentiment is a 
unique defense mechanism that undermines civic virtue to stifle the 
continued expansion of public morality to include historically mar-
ginalized groups. The present age of ressentiment gives new reso-
nance to Celeste Condit’s 1987 essay “Crafting Virtue,” in which she 
made a compelling case for a rhetorical concept of public morality 
that is perpetually crafted through collective deliberation rather than 
private and unchanging universals.89 Condit explained that where a 
private sense of morality cannot account for the need for progress, 
public morality recognizes human capacity to transform exclusion-
ary moral codes thought to be timeless and objective. Condit avers 
that if morality were simply a private concern, the collective moral 
order would never have been forced to account for either the human-
ity of people of color or the violence carried out in its name. In short, 
such a perverse moral order would be impervious to change because 
it would, by definition, already be perfect. As ressentiment nests it-
self into public life its effect is to interrupt, if not reverse, the contin-
ued evolution of public morality. Ressentiment does so by inverting 
the civic good so as to privilege negative emotions such as jealousy 
and envy that tear at the fabric of moral systems designed to protect 
against the selfish maximization of self-interest. As Condit argued, 
to the extent that dominant elites control the means of communi-
cation and the public vocabulary, they can represent singular parti-
san interests as universal or moral ones. They can thereby evade the 
modifications, compromises, and larger goods wrought through ago-
nistic competition between values and interests. Dominant elites thus 
hijack the moral potential for partisan ends.90 
A theory of ressentiment not only corroborates how public moral-
ity is seized for private gain but also illustrates how civic virtue itself 
might be simply rendered undesirable by those who are incapable or 
unwilling to live by its dictates. 
Ressentiment stands against the improvement of public morality 
and those who it enraptures are relieved of their moral duties to oth-
ers. Ressentiment names the debasement of public morality that is 
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the very ethical foundation of rhetorical practice. It represents rheto-
ric as its most demeaning caricature: self-serving, emotionally over-
wrought, and unconcerned with truth or ethics. Ressentiment offers 
rhetorical theory a diagnostic for the moral and emotional defilement 
of the public that from time-to-time imperils democracies. Where re-
sentment is a discrete and short-lived phenomenon which democracy 
is sometimes equipped to address, ressentiment bespeaks the perverse 
emotional and moral attachment to superficial injuries that demo-
cratic institutions cannot remedy. Ressentiment, then, makes sense 
of how dominant groups reign in progressive forces that might chal-
lenge their status by evacuating civic virtue of meaning and replacing 
it with a self-serving imitation of the good. 
It is important to note that though Trump’s voice is the shrillest, 
he is neither aberration nor originator. Ressentiment is a cultural mi-
asma, a feature of public life in which the affective charge of rage and 
envy underwrites participation in the polity more so than empathy 
and virtue. Thus, journalist Jeremy Peters has observed a number of 
political candidates who have begun to mimic Trump’s style.91 For in-
stance, West Virginia Senate candidate Don Blankenship aggressively 
touted calls to jail Trump’s political opponents. Georgia gubernato-
rial candidate Michael Williams drove a self-dubbed “deportation bus” 
around the state while Governor Brian Kemp ran an ad in which he 
bragged that he owned a  truck  “in case I  need to  round  up  crimi-
nal illegals  and take them  home myself.”92 In the 2018 midterm elec-
tions, some Republican candidates capitalized on a deep reservoir of 
public anger and animosity by calling for violent mass deportations, 
glorifying violence and toughness, mocking and insulting political op-
ponents, and demanding unflinching loyalty to the president.93 These 
mimicries illustrate that while Trump is a powerful articulator, the 
rhetoric of ressentiment has become an effective conduit for anyone 
wishing to channel alienation into political projects premised on cru-
elty, revenge, and noble suffering. In this age of ressentiment it is eas-
ier to debase civic virtue, blame racial Others, fantasize about violence 
and revenge, and wallow in self-pity than it is to live up to the lofty 
democratic ideals to which the nation nominally aspires. 
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